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AEREO, IN-LINE LINKING, AND A NEW APPROACH 
TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT FOR EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES 
Shannon McGovern+ 
“Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and make it 
universally accessible and useful.”1 
 
Google receives approximately two million queries every second and 
produces results to each search in a fraction of a second.2  In 2007 and 2010, 
Google faced allegations of copyright infringement brought by Perfect 10, 
Inc. 3 —an online business that sold photographs of nude models to its 
subscribers.4  In Perfect 10 v. Amazon, Inc.,5 Perfect 10 took issue with Google’s 
practice of producing thumbnail images, via the Google Image search service, 
of Perfect 10’s copyrighted content.6  Moreover, the thumbnail images linked to 
full-size versions of the images that appeared within a Google Web page under 
Google’s logo.7  The images, in fact, were not located on Google’s Web page or 
even on Google’s server.8  Rather, Google’s Web page simply linked to the 
copyrighted image residing on Perfect 10’s server, which generally was only 
accessible to paying subscribers.9  On the surface, a user’s interaction with 
Google’s Image service looks and feels illicit—Google was displaying the 
images without Perfect 10’s permission and portraying full-quality versions as 
                                                          
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 
2013, Washington and Lee University.  The author would like to sincerely thank Professor Megan 
La Belle for her expertise and guidance on this topic and her colleagues on the Catholic University 
Law Review for their contributions to this Note.  Lastly, the author wishes to thank her family for 
their unwavering love and support during the writing process and throughout law school. 
 1. GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/about/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).  In 1998, 
Larry Page and Sergey Brin, whom met at Stanford University, founded Google. Company, 
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/about/company (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
 2. Jillian D’Onfro & Dylan Love, 11 Crazy-Interesting Facts About Google, BUS. INSIDER 
(Aug. 12, 2014, 9:41 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/crazy-interesting-facts-about-google-
2014-8?op=1. 
 3. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484, 2010 WL 9479060, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2010) aff’d, 
653 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 4. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1154. 
 5. 508 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 6. See id. at 1155–56, 57. 
 7. Id. at 1156. 
 8. Id. at 1160. 
 9. See id. at 1157. 
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if the images were a part of its own Web page.10  Nevertheless, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that this behavior—referred to as 
“in-line linking”—did not directly infringe upon Perfect 10’s exclusive right to 
copy and display its photographs.11 
As it turned out, Google did not infringe upon Perfect 10’s copyright because 
Google, having never saved the photos to its own servers, did not expressly 
“copy” the images for the purposes of the Copyright Act. 12   Does this 
technological distinction matter?  Clearly, the Ninth Circuit believed it did.13  
However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Broadcasting Cos. 
v. Aereo Inc.14 suggests that alleged copyright infringers like Google may no 
longer be able to avoid liability based on the perceived technological loopholes 
evident in Perfect 10. 
Aereo involved a different type of technology than Perfect 10, namely a 
“service that allows [its subscribers] to watch television programs over the 
Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the air” via 
“thousands of dime-sized antennas housed in a central warehouse.”15  The Court 
held “that Aereo ‘perform[s]’ petitioners’ copyrighted works ‘publicly,’” as 
defined by the Copyright Act, and therefore violates the cable companies’ 
copyright.16  This decision was partially founded in the Court’s determination 
that when their “commercial objectives[s]” are essentially the same, 
technological differences between Aereo and the cable companies becomes 
irrelevant.17  The majority deliberately moved away from a technology-based 
infringement analysis, noting that the subscribers to Aereo’s service were 
indifferent to such distinctions and, at the end of the day, were able to view 
infringing videos from their personal computers.18 
This Note argues that, in an ever-changing technological landscape, strictly 
adhering to the language and definitions of the Copyright Act in cases involving 
emerging technologies may contravene the purpose and intent of copyright law.  
It further argues that Aereo’s commercial interest rationale paves the way for a 
new approach to technologically complex copyright cases.  Part I of this Note 
begins with an overview of copyright law, followed by a brief history of the 
Internet and the World Wide Web, and provides an explanation of how Web 
pages are created and how they interact and communicate with other Web pages.  
Part I concludes with an overview of case law from the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
for the Ninth and Seventh Circuits dealing with in-line linking and copyright 
                                                          
 10. Id. at 1160–61. 
 11. Id. at 1159–60 (upholding the District Court’s decision). 
 12. Id. at 1160–61. 
 13. See id. 
 14. 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 15. Id. at 2503. 
 16. Id. at 2511 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
 17. Id. at 2508. 
 18. See id. at 2507–08. 
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infringement, revealing a tendency of courts to use technological distinctions to 
find that in-line linking is not an infringing use of copyrighted content on the 
Internet.  Part II analyzes the recent Supreme Court decision in Aereo, with 
emphasis on the majority’s “commercial interest” discussion.  Finally, Part III 
of this Note will show how the rationale in Aereo seamlessly translates to in-line 
linking of Web content, and Part IV concludes that an application of the 
“commercial interest” analysis could change the outcome of future copyright 
infringement cases involving in-line linking of creative content. 
I.  THE AMORPHOUS LANDSCAPE OF TECHNOLOGY AND COPYRIGHT LAW 
A.  A Legal Tradition: The Basics of Copyright Doctrine 
Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress 
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”19  Accordingly, Congress enacted the Copyright Act 
to incentivize creativity and the sharing of knowledge.20  The Copyright Act 
gives authors of creative original works21 five “exclusive rights” to reproduce, 
distribute, prepare derivative works, publicly perform,22 and publicly display the 
original work.23  An original work is “created” once it is “fixed” in some tangible 
form,24 such that it may be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated 
for a period of more than transitory duration.”25  An intrusion on any one of the 
author’s five exclusive rights is infringement.26 
A person who infringes on another’s copyright need not have intended to do 
so; rather, he need only have in fact copied the original work.27  The Act defines 
“copies” of original works as “material objects . . . in which a work is fixed . . . 
and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated.”28  On the other hand, a “derivative work” is not an exact copy 
                                                          
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 20. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
 21. The bar measuring creativity of a work is “extremely low” and allows most creative works 
to qualify for copyright protections as long as they “posess[] at least some minimal degree of 
creativity.”  See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 22. 17 U.S.C § 101 (2012).  The Copyright Act states that “perform” means to “render” a 
work “either directly or by means of any device or process,” or to show an audiovisual work’s 
“images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.”  Id.  To perform 
“publicly” refers to doing so anywhere that is “open to the public” or where “a substantial number 
of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.”  Id. 
 23. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984). 
 27. Carter v. Haw. Transp. Co., 201 F. Supp. 301, 302 (D. Haw. 1961). 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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of an original work, but rather a copy consisting of “editorial revisions, 
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an 
original work of authorship.”29  A good example of a derivative work is a motion 
picture that is based on a copyrighted book. 
A party proves infringement by showing, first, that he owns the copyright to 
the work in question and, second, that the defendant has copied the work in 
violation of the copyright.30  In practice, a plaintiff proves copying by showing 
that the defendant’s work bears “substantial similarity” to the original and that 
the defendant had access to the original.31  The determination of “substantial 
similarity” between an original and alleged copy is ascertained by the “‘ordinary 
observer’ test,” that is, “whether an average lay observer would recognize the 
alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”32  If the 
defendant has indeed copied the plaintiff’s work, the investigation’s next step is 
to decide whether the copying was an impermissible appropriation.33  Again, the 
test to determine whether the copy “reach[es] the point of ‘unlawful 
appropriation,’ or the copying of the protected expression itself,” and thus 
infringement, is a question for the lay observer.34 
When third parties are involved in infringing activities, particularly in an 
Internet setting, parties who have not directly infringed on an author’s copyright 
may nonetheless be liable as indirect infringers.35  An indirect, or contributory 
infringer is one who has control over a third party’s use of copyrighted materials 
and fails to regulate direct infringement by the third parties. 36   To prove 
contributory infringement, a claimant must show that the contributory infringer 
“‘kn[ew] or ha[d] reason to know’ of direct infringement,” and somehow 
“encourage[d] or assist[ed]” the infringement.”37  Similarly, entities in a position 
                                                          
 29. Id. 
 30. Ferguson v. NBC, 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 31. See Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); Whitney v. Ross Jungnickel, Inc., 179 
F. Supp. 751, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“[I]t is virtually impossible to adduce direct proof of copying 
. . . .  Evidence of copying must necessarily be circumstantial and is ordinarily based on proof of 
access and similarity.”)). 
 32. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022–23 (2d Cir. 1966) (citing Comptone 
Co. v. Rayex Corp., 251 F.2d 487, 488 (2d Cir. 1958)). 
 33. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (noting the distinction of illegal copying). 
 34. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 
1164–65 (9th Cir. 1977) superseded by statute on other grounds, 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), as recognized 
in Segal v. Rogue Pictures, 544 F. App’x 769, 770 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 35. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928, 941 (2005) 
(defining contributory and vicarious liability). 
 36. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) 
(determining Sony not liable for contributory infringement despite the fact that Sony manufactured 
a VCR recorder and knew it could be used to record copyrighted movies and programs without 
Universal’s permission). 
 37. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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to both supervise a third party’s infringement and to directly profit from the 
infringement will, absent any viable defense, be held vicariously liable for the 
impermissible use of the work.38 
The Copyright Act provides for various affirmative defenses to infringement, 
including the fair use doctrine. 39   The fair use defense is designed to 
“balance First Amendment concerns with the protections otherwise afforded 
authors by the Copyright Act.”40  Section 107 states that unauthorized use of 
copyrighted material for “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research” may 
constitute fair use.41  In deciding whether a defendant’s infringing use is fair, 
courts must balance four factors: “(1) the purpose and character of the use . . . ; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of 
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”42  In 
other words, the fair use defense is always assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
B.  Contemporary Developments and Universal Connectivity 
Since its inception, the Internet has, by its very nature, represented 
connectivity and innovation.43  Communications via the Internet consisted of 
                                                          
 38. Id. at 1022.  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act generally exempts Internet service 
providers from contributory or vicarious liability. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (c) (2012); see, e.g., 
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025 (discussing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act). 
 39. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 40. Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1238 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 107.  Courts have made clear that even a use that falls within one of the 
enumerated categories in Section 107 is not automatically fair use.  See Douglas L. Rogers, 
Increasing Access to Knowledge Through Fair Use—Analyzing The Google Litigation to Unleash 
Developing Countries, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 24 n.93 (2007).  Courts utilize the 
four-factor test when determining fair use.  See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 
471 U.S. 539, 560–61 (1985) (applying the four fair-use factors “identified by Congress as 
especially relevant in determining whether the use was fair”). 
 42. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 43. See RON WHITE, HOW COMPUTERS WORK 309–11 (Todd Brakke et al. eds., 9th ed. 
2010).  The Internet was the product of a government project initiated by President Eisenhower in 
1958 called the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).  Id. at 309; see also ARPA-DARPA: 
The Name Chronicles, DARPA, http://www.darpa.mil/About/History/ARPA-DARPA__The_ 
Name_Chronicles.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).  The Internet began with the first computer 
network, ARPANET (Advanced Projects Research Agency Network), consisting of four 
universities collaborating on research into the development of a worldwide Web system.  Imagining 
the Internet: A History and Forecast, ELON U. SCH. COMM., http://www.elon.edu/e-web/ 
predictions/about.xhtml (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).  ARPA’s initial focus, American space travel, 
was eventually turned over to NASA and ARPA became a sponsor for university research projects.  
WHITE, supra, at 309.  ARPA researchers developed ARPAnet, a network connecting computers at 
discrete university locations, to facilitate communications and information sharing among the 
researchers.  Id. at 310.  Thus, the Internet was born, and in 1991 the National Science Foundation 
opened the Internet to the public.  See id. at 311. 
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text only until Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web in 198944 and 
the Internet expanded into a multi-media platform that supports graphics, sound, 
and video. 45   Since 1991, the Internet has stretched worldwide, creating a 
“network with more than 100 million users that are linked for the exchange of 
data, news, conversation, and commerce.”46 
Berners-Lee designed the World Wide Web as a “universal” platform for 
information sharing such that users can “link to absolutely any piece of 
information.”47  Berners-Lee has said “universality is essential to the Web: it 
looses [sic] its power if there are certain types of things to which you can’t 
link.”48 
Today, there are so many people using the Internet that researchers can only 
estimate as to the exact number. 49   Within the Web framework there are 
                                                          
 44. Tim Berners-Lee, W3, http://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/ (last visited Apr. 4, 
2015).  Tim Berners-Lee is an English computer scientist and is the Director of the World Wide 
Web Consortium, “a Web standards organization founded in 1994 which develops interoperable 
technologies (specifications, guidelines, software, and tools) to lead the Web to its full potential.”  
Id. 
 45. WHITE, supra note 43, at 311. 
 46. Id. at 312; see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 
F. Supp. 1231, 1238 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (describing the Internet as a “network of networks” for 
global communications).  The International Telecommunication Union predicts that “by [the] end 
[of] 2014, there will be almost 3 billion Internet users.”  Press Release, ITU, ITU Releases 2014 
ICT Figures, ITU (May 5, 2014), http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/2014/23.aspx#. 
VGS7EvTF8uo. 
 47. Tim Berners-Lee, Realising the Full Potential of the Web, W3 (Dec. 3, 1997), 
http://www.w3.org/1998/02/Potential.html.  According to Berners-Lee, “universality” means 
providing access to facts and science, constructing a forum for collaboration, and sharing a medium 
for art and literature and opening works to discussion and subjective analysis.  Id.  In Berners-Lee’s 
opinion, anything and everything should be accessible.  Id. 
 48. Id.  Berners-Lee noted: 
For [the Web] to work, it had to be not only easy to “browse”, but also easy to express 
oneself.  In a world of people and information, the people and information should be in 
some kind of equilibrium.  Anything in the Web can be quickly learned by a person and 
any knowledge you see as being missing from the Web can be quickly added.  The Web 
should be a medium for the communication between people: communication through 
shared knowledge.  For this to work, the computers, networks, operating systems and 
commands have to become invisible, and leave us with an intuitive interface as directly 
as possible to the information. 
Id. 
 49. Imagining the Internet, supra note 43.  The number of Internet users has grown 
exponentially from approximately forty-five million users in 1996 to a number unable to accurately 
be calculated.  Id.  For any task not intuitive to the average user, simple Google searches return 
practically infinite websites, blogs, and discussion forums that provide instructions on anything 
from troubleshooting tips to instructions to build a personal website.  See, e.g., Philip Bloom, 
Uploading Videos to the Internet: Six Easy-to-Follow Steps, PROF. PHOTOGRAPHER MAG. (Mar. 4, 
2010, 11:28 AM), http://www.ppmag.com/web-exclusives/2010/03/video-to-internet.html 
(explaining how to upload a video file to the Internet in just “Six Easy-to-Follow Steps,” noting 
that, “[i]n general, uploading videos to websites is a fairly easy process”). 
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components that support the use and demand for the large amounts of data 
associated with any graphic or video file.50 
The Web consists of Internet servers that store and supply files to clients and 
can link to other servers.51  Servers can read Hyper Text Markup Language, or 
HTML, documents and translate them into a Web page.52  HTML is a series of 
“tags,” or keywords, designating elements contained on the Web page, such as 
text, images, and links.53  A Web browser that resides on a personal computer,54 
such as Safari or Google Chrome, interprets the HTML tags and displays the 
designated content as specified by the HTML code, generating the page seen by 
the end user on his computer screen.55 
HTML supports the use of links, or connections, between Web pages.56  Most 
users interact with hyperlinks, which might be a short phrase or icon that 
“conceals” a Web address to another Web page.57  A user may click on these 
embedded links, or “pointer[s],” and be instantly taken from one website to 
another.58  These links initiate a “source” anchor that connects to a “destination” 
anchor, “which may be any Web resource (e.g., an image, a video clip, a sound 
bite, a program, an HTML document, an element within an HTML document, 
etc.).”59  Linking facilitates much of the functionality the Internet provides, 
including providing easy access, efficient research capabilities, and extensive 
resources.60  For such a “simple” function, “the link has been one of the primary 
forces driving the success of the Web.”61 
Links that simply take a user from one Web page to another are “direct 
links.”62  The utility and the “power of the Web stems from the ability of a link 
                                                          
 50. WHITE, supra note 43, at 361.  The volume of data is managed by bandwidth, or the 
“capacity of a channel to carry information.”  Id. at 311.  In other words, bandwidth determines 
how much data can be transmitted at a given time and thus, wider bandwidths facilitate faster data 
communication.  See id. 
 51. Id. at 313. 
 52. See infra notes 56–61 and accompanying text (defining HTML and the dynamic between 
HTML code and Web pages). 
 53. See WHITE, supra note 43, at 370 (explaining that “HTML is a collection of codes 
enclosed in angle brackets — <> — that control the formatting of text in the file”). 
 54. Id. at 311. 
 55. HTML Introduction, W3SCHOOLS.COM, http://www.w3schools.com/html/html_intro.asp 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
 56. Links, W3, http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/struct/links.html (last visited Apr. 4, 
2015). 
 57. WHITE, supra note 43, at 368. 
 58. Hypertext Linking and Copyright Issues, AM. LIBR. ASS’N, http://www.ala.org/advocacy/ 
copyright/copyrightarticle/hypertextlinking (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
 59. Links, supra note 56. 
 60. Hypertext Linking and Copyright Issues, supra note 58. 
 61. Links, supra note 56. 
 62. Hypertext Linking and Copyright Issues, supra note 58. 
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to point to any document, regardless of its status or physical location.”63  A 
website consists of any number of Web pages including the website’s “home 
page,” which a visitor generally views first prior to clicking on links to navigate 
to other pages within the website.64  Although it is efficient and customary to 
have on one’s Web page, direct linking to other websites can be a controversial 
practice if such a use encroaches upon the boundaries of copyright law.65 
Despite links having proven to be a driving force behind the accessibility of 
the Web, 66  problems have arisen with respect to certain types of linking 
practices.  First, website owners have complained about a practice called “deep 
linking,” in which a hyperlink allows users to bypass a website’s home page and 
be taken directly to a destination Web page within the website.67  This practice 
concerns website publishers who primarily place advertisements on the 
homepage because visitors generally access a website’s home page first. 68  
When a third party posts a hyperlink to an interior page of the source website, 
visitors can access sought-after information without ever visiting the homepage, 
denying the owner of the home page’s potential ad revenue.69  Over the past 
fifteen years, United States courts have considered arguments concerning the 
legality of deep linking, but so far no such ruling has been made.70 
The permissibility of deep linking was considered in Ticketmaster Corp. v. 
Tickets.com, Inc.,71 in which Tickets.com provided links on its website directing 
visitors to a particular interior page on Ticketmaster’s website, bypassing 
Ticketmaster’s homepage.72  Ticketmaster alleged copyright infringement by 
                                                          
 63. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 64. See Brian D. Wassom, Copyright Implications of “Unconventional Linking” on the World 
Wide Web: Framing, Deep Linking and Inlining, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 181, 192 (1998) 
(describing the home page as the “front door” to a website—noting that the home page generally 
explains the site’s purpose and displays links that give a user an idea of the site’s “navigational 
structure”). 
 65. See Mike Masnick, Is Inline Linking to an Image Copyright Infringement?, TECHDIRT 
(Jan. 6, 2010, 7:28 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100105/0109067611.stml; Foye 
Robinson, How to Create a Direct Link, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/how_5340920_create-
direct.html (last visited Apr. 4. 2015). 
 66. Links, supra note 56. 
 67. See Wassom, supra note 64, at 192–93 (providing a background on deep linking). 
 68. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., CV 99-76542, 2000 WL 525390, at *2, *4 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000). 
 69. See Wassom, supra note 64, at 192–93. 
 70. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly 
v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2003); Ticketmaster Corp., 2000 WL 525390, at 
*2, *4. 
 71. CV 99-76542, 2000 WL 525390, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000). 
 72. Id. at *1.  Tickets.com sold some tickets from its site, but primarily provided information 
to visitors about where and how they might purchase tickets along with direct links to interior pages 
on Ticketmaster’s website.  Id. 
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Tickets.com.73  The court held that deep linking is not inherently a copyright 
violation because no actual copying of information occurs.74  Rather, the visitor 
that clicks on the link is simply transferred to the source site and “there is no 
deception in what is happening.”75 
Another practice that has raised serious concern is “in-line linking,” in which 
media from a source website is displayed on, and appears as part of, the linking 
website.76  Instead of taking the user to the full destination Web page as a direct 
link would, an in-line link facilitates a connection between the linking website 
and the source website so that the user has full access to the source website’s 
media, without ever leaving the linking website.77  In fact, the user generally has 
no idea the content does not actually reside on the linking site.78 
Not all in-line linking is devious,79 but it undeniably has the capability to harm 
a source website’s commercial interests in its content, especially when the 
content is linked without the source’s permission.80  Not only might the linking 
website use the source’s potentially creative works without credit or permission, 
but also the linking website may provide such unauthorized access using the 
bandwidth paid for by the source site while denying the source site the 
commercial benefits of those users. 81   Outside of agreements between 
                                                          
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. at *2. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2003); Mark Sableman, Link 
Law Revisited: Internet Linking Law at Five Years, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1273, 1297 (2001) 
(stating that the practice of in-line linking “[a]t the very least . . . seems sneaky,” and comparing it 
to painting a picture of a museum gallery, in effect, “importing” the same visual experience onto 
the copier’s canvas). 
 77. See Sableman, supra note 76, at 1297. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Zi Chu & Haining Wang, An Investigation of Hotlinking and Its Countermeasures, 34 
COMPUTER COMM. 577, 577 (May 25, 2010), available at http://www.cs.wm.edu/~hnw/paper/ 
comcom11.pdf (describing a few benefits of in-line linking).  Where both the source site and the 
linking site have approved the in-line linking of the source site’s content or made some sort of 
business arrangement, the linking is “benign.”  Id.  For instance, “a site may include some ad images 
provided by an advertisement syndicator to make advertising revenue,” and “[i]t does not need to 
host any ad images by itself, but link them from the syndicator’s server.”  Id. 
 80. The Web development community regards this behavior as “unethical.”  See id. 
(describing Web developers who engage in unauthorized in-line linking as “lazy” and 
“unprofessional”); see also Matthew Scherb, Free Content’s Future: Advertising, Technology, and 
Copyright, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1787, 1794 (2004) (observing the tension between content 
distributors’ commercial interest in drawing Internet traffic to their websites and the interactive 
nature of the Internet that allows consumers to “easily manipulate content to avoid the very 
advertisements supporting that content”). 
 81. Chu & Wang, supra note 79, at 577; see Brad M. Scheller, Hey, Keep Your Links to 
Yourself! Legal Challenges to Thumbnails and Inline Linking on the Web and the Potential 
Implications of a First Impression Decision in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 10 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. 
L.J. 415, 433 (2003) (noting that the massive growth in Internet use “has created an influx of people 
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companies,82 scholars see potential for copyright issues in a technology that 
“permit[s] a web publisher . . . to associate itself with the content of another 
party and to create new adaptive web displays combining content from both 
sites.”83 
C.  The “Server Test”: Courts Allow Infringing Behavior to Slip Through a 
Technological Loophole 
Several courts have examined copyright claims stemming from in-line 
linking.  This issue was first considered by the Ninth Circuit in Kelly v. Arriba 
Soft Corp.84  Kelly was a professional photographer who displayed and uploaded 
some of his photographs to his own website, as well as to others through 
licensing agreements.85  Arriba operated a search engine that produced results in 
                                                          
using the Web for commercial profit through advertisements and self-promotion,” and discussing 
how website owners and advertisers are frustrated by the “multiple linking techniques that allow 
users to avoid Web site advertisements and, in turn, hinder commercial exposure and a Web page 
owner’s ability to charge for advertising”). 
 82. Amazon and Google have an agreement by which Amazon sends customer search queries 
to Google, who actually performs the search and generates results that are in-line-linked to 
Amazon’s Web page.  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2007).  
To the Amazon customer the results appear to come directly from Amazon, as with any in-line-
linked media, but Google is fully aware of the linking and gets paid for the service it provides, per 
the agreement.  See id. 
 83. Sableman, supra note 76, at 1297.  Similar copyright concerns are associated with the 
practice of “framing.”  See Linking, Framing, Meta Tags, and Caching, HARV. L., http://cyber.law. 
harvard.edu/property00/metatags/main.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2015) (discussing how framing 
may “undermine the rights of Web site owners”).  Framing creates “independently scrollable” 
structures within a Web page within which anything from a single graphic to an entire external Web 
page may be displayed.  Sableman, supra note 76, at 1277.  Concerns with framing were brought 
to bear in 1997 when a number of news publishers, including The Washington Post, sued Total 
News, a website that aggregates news from different sources and frames the articles on its own 
website.  Id. at 1299.  The Total News site today is simply an aggregation of text hyperlinks to 
news articles.  See TOTAL NEWS, http://www.totalnews.com/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).  The 
plaintiffs’ concerns were, first, that Total News’s frames provided select parts of the linked Web 
pages rather than the entire page the user would see if directly linked to the publishers’ pages, and, 
second, that Total News’s frames cut out the publishers’ banner advertisements while Total News’s 
advertisements surrounded the frames.  Sableman, supra note 76, at 1273.  The case settled on the 
condition that Total News refrain from selectively framing, and rather link to whole Web pages 
instead.  Id. at 1300.  Another framing case, Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, Inc., No. 
CV 97-6991, 1998 WL 132922 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 1997), actually proceeded to trial, but the 
California District Court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that defendant’s framing practices were 
confusing and deceptive because it was unable to identify an actual harm to plaintiff.  Id. at *1.  
Neither case produced particularly helpful guidelines in assessing problems with unauthorized 
framing, but both certainly vindicated and exacerbated website owners’ concerns regarding the 
potential violations of their commercial interests. 
 84. 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 85. Id. at 815. 
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the form of thumbnail images,86 which in-line linked to full-sized images on 
Kelly’s website, while still displaying Arriba’s logo and advertising.87  Kelly 
sued, arguing that Arriba’s use of full-sized and thumbnail images owned by 
Kelly was infringement.88 
The Ninth Circuit held that the thumbnail images were “transformative,” and 
therefore constituted fair use of Kelly’s copyrighted works.89  The court reached 
this conclusion despite noting, as part of its fair use analysis, that Kelly had a 
legitimate interest in drawing visitors to his website—both to sell his own 
products and to generate advertising revenue.90  This holding hinged on the fact 
that the thumbnails were much smaller and of lower quality than the full-sized 
originals, which the court believed lessened the probability of viewers copying 
the thumbnails and using them for display or resale.91  However, the Ninth 
Circuit ultimately punted the infringement analysis with respect to the full-sized 
images on remand without any recommendations on the issue.92 
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon,93 the Ninth Circuit adopted the “server test” to 
address Google’s image search engine, which utilized in-line linking.94  Under 
the server test, if a “computer owner . . . stores an image as electronic 
information and serves that electronic information directly to the user,” he 
infringes on the image owner’s copyright because he “displays” it within the 
meaning of the Copyright Act. 95   Therefore, whether or not a person has 
                                                          
 86. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2002), withdrawn, and rev’d 
in part on other grounds, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).  The software underlying the search engine 
would search the Web for images, download full-sized copies onto Arriba’s server, and “generate 
smaller, lower-resolution thumbnails of the images.”  Id. at 938. 
 87. See id. at 938–39. 
 88. Id. at 938. 
 89. Id. at 943–44. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. at 944. 
 92. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003).  The Ninth Circuit 
stated that the District Court improperly addressed the infringement issues with respect to the full-
sized images because neither party requested summary judgment as to the full-sized images.  Id.  
The fair use holding regarding Arriba’s use of the thumbnail images was affirmed on appeal.  Id. 
at 815. 
 93. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 94. Id. at 1159.  Google Image Search produces results to user queries in the form of small, 
low-resolution thumbnail images.  Id. at 1155.  Google’s HTML code contains instructions that 
locate the image source, download the full-sized image, and display it framed within a Google Web 
page.  Id.  Google never saves the images, it in-line links to the images saved on the source’s server.  
Id. at 1155 n.2.  Perfect 10 sells photographs of nude models to customers who subscribe to its 
website and pay a monthly fee for access to the website.  Id. at 1157.  From May 2001 to 2005, 
Perfect 10 sent repeated takedown notices to Google warning of Google’s infringing use of Perfect 
10’s images through the image search engine.  Id.  Perfect 10 filed a claim for copyright 
infringement against Google in 2004, seeking an injunction to prevent Google from using Perfect 
10 images in its thumbnail search results and in-line linking to the full versions.  Id. 
 95. Id. at 1159–60. 
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infringed on another’s exclusive display rights hinges on if and where data is 
stored.96  The manner of sharing the data—such as in-line linking or framing—
bears no weight on the server test analysis. 97   The court decided that for 
copyright purposes, a digital photo is “fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression,” and any time the photo is stored on a server, a disk, or any storage 
mechanism, such action constitutes making a “copy.”98 
In carrying out the infringement analysis, the Amazon court continued to 
analyze Google’s interactions 99  with Perfect 10’s images in terms of the 
technological interactions with the photos.100  The court found that although 
Google in-line linked to and displayed Perfect 10’s copyrighted full-sized 
images, Google nonetheless did not infringe because it did not store those 
images on Google’s servers and thus never made a “copy” within the meaning 
of the Copyright Act.101  The court explained that Google simply “provides 
HTML instructions that direct a user’s browser to a website publisher’s 
computer that stores the full-size photographic image,” and HTML code, the 
court said, does not constitute a “copy.”102 
In Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter,103 the Seventh Circuit examined a claim by 
Flava Works104—a website that provides access to pornographic videos behind 
a “pay wall.”105  Specifically, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the in-line 
linking of Flava’s videos by the social bookmarking site myVidster106 infringed 
                                                          
 96. Id. at 1159. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1160 (internal quotations omitted); see also MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 
991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that saving a program to a computer’s memory 
constituted the making of a “copy” of the program because the saved version could be “perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated,” and thus was “fixed” within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act). 
 99. Both Google and Amazon addressed the same activity, but Amazon was implicated under 
its agreement with Google.  See supra note 82 (describing the agreement). 
 100. See Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1160–61 (discussing the effect of storing an image). 
 101. See id.  The District Court for the Northern District of California adopted the rule 
established in Amazon.com that “in-line linking to a full-size image does not constitute direct 
infringement,” to justify its finding that a search engine’s in-line linking to full-sized images owned 
by Perfect 10 did not infringe on Perfect 10’s exclusive right to display the images.  Perfect 10, Inc. 
v. Yandex N.V., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 102. See Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1161.  The Court reasoned that Google merely facilitated a 
user’s ability to display Perfect 10’s images by providing HTML instructions to the user’s browser 
and that the browser in turn “interact[ed]” with the server that stored the images.  Id. 
 103. 689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 104. Flava Works, Inc. was a company that produced and distributed pornographic videos to 
host websites.  See id. at 755. 
 105. Id. at 756.  Viewers pay a fee in advance before they are given access to the videos and 
“must agree not to copy, transmit, sell, etc. the video, although Flava’s terms of use permit the user 
to download it to his computer for his ‘personal, noncommercial use’—only.”  Id. at 756. 
 106. See id. at 756–57.  myVidster provides a forum for visitors to submit the embed codes for 
videos.  Id. at 756.  Using the embed code, myVidster designs a page to display the video that 
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upon Flava’s copyright under a contributory infringement theory.107  The court 
noted the negative impact myVidster’s website had on Flava’s business by 
“encouraging its subscribers to circumvent Flava’s pay wall.”108  However, the 
court was not persuaded that this facilitation amounted to infringement since the 
visitors of myVidster bypassing Flava’s pay wall are “no more of a copyright 
infringer than if [they] had snuck into a movie theater and watched a copyrighted 
movie without buying a ticket.”109  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that 
myVidster did not directly infringe on Flava’s reproduction and distribution 
rights under the Copyright Act, nor did it induce such infringement.110  The court 
based its finding in part on a technology-based analysis similar to the Ninth 
Circuit’s server test. 111   The court held that had myVidster still offered its 
“premium membership,” this would have altered the court’s analysis and 
resulted in a finding for direct infringement because the membership offered a 
“backup service,” which the court reasoned constituted making copies of videos 
in violation of Flava’s exclusive rights to do so. 112   Because myVidster 
discontinued the backup service and therefore no longer made “copies” of 
videos, myVidster was not directly infringing on Flava’s exclusive rights.113 
The Flava court encountered an issue similar to one that would present itself 
to the Aereo Court: whether a website that streams copyrighted videos online 
publicly performs them when the audience downloads and views the videos at 
discreet times and places. 114   The court considered two interpretations of 
“performance”:115 a performance could occur when a viewer uploads a video, 
                                                          
visitors access by clicking on a corresponding thumbnail image.  Id.  Clicking on the thumbnail 
opens the video page that is streaming the video from the source website’s server, but appears in a 
myVidster window with advertising that finances the myVidster site and for all intents and purposes 
seems to be streaming from myVidster’s site.  See id.  The code contained within the thumbnail 
image provides both the video’s address and playback instructions.  Id.  Flava Works’ customers 
who paid for private use of the videos and then provided the embed code to myVidster were creating 
unauthorized copies of Flava Works’s videos and therefore infringing on Flava Works’s copyright.  
Id. at 757. 
 107. See id. at 758. 
 108. Id. at 757. 
 109. Id. at 758 (“The facilitator of conduct that doesn’t infringe copyright is not a contributory 
infringer.”). 
 110. Id. at 761–62. 
 111. See id. at 760–62; see supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 112. Flava Works, 689 F.3d at 762–63.  The court indicated that Flava might still have been 
entitled to injunctive relief, even though myVidster no longer offered the subscription service and 
thus was no longer “copying” videos.  Id. at 762. 
 113. Id. at 762–63. 
 114. Id. at 761.  The Seventh Circuit suggests it would be helpful in this case if Congress 
established a more precise definition of public performance under the Copyright Act, which could 
be indicative of the Copyright Act’s weakening efficacy in deciding copyright issues in a rapidly 
evolving technological landscape. Id.; see infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 115. Flava Works, 689 F.3d at 760–61. 
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thus making himself “capable of viewing it” and placing greater responsibility 
on the third-party viewer; or a performance could occur when a viewer actually 
plays the video, thus placing greater liability on the hosting party.116  The court 
seemed hesitant to proscribe a definition that would make myVidster liable 
because technically, myVidster never interacted with the image data. 117  
Ultimately, the court found that myVidster did not encourage such infringement 
simply by hosting its website.118 
II. AEREO: VIRTUALLY ABANDONING TECH-BASED INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have steadfastly adhered to traditional 
infringement analysis, continually interpreting the language of the Copyright 
Act by the definitions set out in 1976.119  At that time, the public had not even 
heard of the Internet, and technologies such as tablets, smartphones, and wireless 
networks were certainly not fixtures in our daily lives.120 
In the recent Aereo121 decision, the Supreme Court grappled with yet another 
new technology involving the Internet.122  The Aereo opinion notably diverts 
from the traditional copyright analysis used in the linking opinions by the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits and instead looks at the purpose of the Copyright 
Act as the legal system is forced to deal with new and developing 
technologies, 123  explicitly acknowledging the vastly changed and uncharted 
technological landscape of the twenty-first century.124  The Court dispensed with 
a high-level, technical evaluation of Aereo’s video streaming technology in 
                                                          
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. at 761.  The Seventh Circuit grasped for a comparable fact pattern to provide a 
definition for public performance, looking to Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 
(9th Cir. 1996).  Fonovisa was a vicarious infringement case that determined the pirating of music 
by the plaintiff who later sold recordings of said music in bulk that were then performed by the 
purchasers, an interaction called a “swap meet,” was a performance.  See Flava, 689 F.3d at 761.  
Finding the factual comparison to Fonovisa too attenuated, the Flava Court then examined In re 
Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), another Seventh Circuit case finding 
infringement where Aimster software encouraged individuals to share copyrighted music over the 
Internet in an “online equivalent of a swap meet.”  Flava, 689 F.3d at 762.  The Flava Court 
ultimately held that because Flava was “not encouraging swapping” it did not “encourage[] 
infringement.”  Id. 
 118. See Flava Works, 689 F.3d at 762. 
 119. See id. at 757–61; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
 120. See Imagining the Internet, supra note 43 (discussing the substantial changes the Internet 
has facilitated since the 1990s). 
 121. American Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 122. See id. at 2503. 
 123. See id. at 2504–06 (discussing the history of the amendments to the Copyright Act in 
response to Court decisions and technological changes). 
 124. Id. at 2511 (“We cannot now answer more precisely how the Transmit Clause or other 
provisions of the Copyright Act will apply to technologies not before us.”). 
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favor of an assessment of the party’s relationship with its commercial clients.125  
The Court noted that, regardless of what might be going on between computers 
and networks behind the scenes, Aereo’s service functioned much like the 
community antenna television systems that the Copyright Act targeted with its 
1976 changes.126  In making this distinction, the Court shifted the focus from the 
technology facilitating infringing activities to the harm to the copyright 
owner.127 
A.  The Technology Bringing Cable to a Computer Near You 
Aereo’s online service platform made available live broadcast television 
programming—without a license from the copyright holders—with only a few 
seconds delay behind the live broadcast to its subscribers.128   The question 
before the Supreme Court was whether Aereo infringed on American 
Broadcasting Companies’s (ABC) exclusive right to publicly perform its 
programs under the Transmit Clause of the Copyright Act129  by offering a 
“technologically complex” subscription service that streamed ABC’s programs 
to individual user’s computers almost simultaneously with ABC’s airing.130 
The Aereo opinion commenced in a similar fashion to that of the Seventh and 
Ninth Circuit opinions described above, unfolding the specific technology by 
which Aereo captured ABC’s broadcasts, and then streamed the broadcasts to 
subscribers over the Internet.131  The Court took note of the three entities in play: 
ABC’s “over-the-air” broadcasts, Aereo’s technology housed in a warehouse, 
and the subscriber at home on his personal computer.132  A subscriber, having 
                                                          
 125. See id. at 2506–08. 
 126. Id. at 2511. 
 127. Id. at 2506–07. 
 128. Id. at 2503.  Subscribers pay Aereo a monthly fee for access to content to which Aereo 
“neither owns the copyright . . . nor holds a license from the copyright owners to perform those 
works publicly.”  Id. 
 129. The Transmit Clause grants a copyright owner the exclusive right to publicly “transmit or 
otherwise communicate a performance” by any technological means “whether the members of the 
public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate 
places and at the same time or at different times.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 130. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2502–03.  Thus, the Court placed great importance on the complexity 
of Aereo’s technology as a determinative factor in whether Aereo was publicly performing ABC’s 
copyrighted programs. 
 131. Compare id. (“Aereo’s system is made up of servers, transcoders, and thousands of dime-
sized antennas housed in a central warehouse.”), with Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 
756 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing “the embed code contain[ed] [in a] video’s web address plus 
instructions for how to display the video” to allow the myVidster platform to “create[] a Web page 
that makes the video appear to be on myVidster’s site”) and Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 
811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003) (“To provide this service, Arriba developed a computer program that 
‘crawls’ the Web looking for images to index.  This crawler downloads full-sized copies of the 
images onto Arriba’s server.”). 
 132. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503. 
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paid for a subscription, selected a show from a list of local programming on 
Aereo’s website.133  Aereo’s server automatically responded to the subscriber’s 
selection by selecting one of thousands of small antennae stored in its 
warehouse, which captured ABC’s broadcast signal and converted it into data 
that can be streamed over the Internet to the subscriber’s computer.134  This data 
was then saved in a “subscriber-specific folder on Aereo’s hard drive,” and the 
subscriber could download the program right then or save it to watch later.135 
In addition to this tripartite analysis, the Aereo Court paid special attention to 
exactly where the data for a program, or rather where each copy of a given 
program, resides at every step of the process each time a subscriber selects a 
program.136  Aereo, in its own argument, “emphasize[d]” that its technology 
designated personal copies of programs for each subscriber, even if more than 
one subscriber selected the same program.137 
B.  Fitting Streaming into a Pre-Internet Framework 
The main question before the Supreme Court in Aereo was whether Aereo 
simply acted as an equipment provider or whether, via its technology, Aereo 
publicly performed ABC’s television programs within the meaning of the 
Transmit Clause of the Copyright Act. 138   The Transmit Clause defines a 
copyright holder’s exclusive right to publicly perform a work as the right 
to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the 
work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the 
members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display 
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time 
or at different times.139 
The Transmit Clause represents Congress’s solution to the Supreme Court’s 
holdings in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. 140  and 
                                                          
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  A subscriber can stream a video from any wireless-enabled device—such as his 
personal computer, table, smartphone, etc.—and by extension can stream a video from virtually 
any location from which he has access to an Internet connection.  See id. 
 136. Id.  The Court even cites to A Dictionary of Computing for a definition of “streaming” in 
its discussion of how long it takes Aereo to deliver a full program to a subscriber and noting the 
almost-instant gratification for users who can view programs mere seconds after ABC broadcasts 
them.  Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. at 2504. 
 139. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 140. 392 U.S. 390, 392–93, 402 (1968) (noting that the defendant’s system, which utilized a 
system of antennae to transmit cable broadcasts to subscribing customers and had a license from 
plaintiff movie copyright holder to broadcast the movies, did not “perform” the movies within the 
meaning of the Copyright Act). 
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Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System Inc., 141  which both 
centered on the question of whether CATV providers142 publicly performed 
copyrighted cable programs by simply distributing the modified signals to the 
public.143  The Transmit Clause dispenses with line drawing that distinguishes 
broadcaster functions from viewer functions and provides that, on either end, 
both parties perform. 144   The Aereo Court explained that by enacting the 
Transmit Clause, Congress “[brought] the activities of cable systems within the 
scope of the Copyright Act.”145 
Therefore, recognizing “that Aereo is not simply an equipment provider,” the 
Court categorized Aereo’s technology as “substantially similar to those of the 
CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to reach,” thus placing 
Aereo’s technology under the scrutiny of the Transmit Clause.146 
1.  Aereo Performs by Streaming 
In deciding whether Aereo “performs” ABC’s programs within the meaning 
of the Transmit Clause, the Court ultimately ignored the technological nuances 
between CATV systems and Aereo’s technology as a basis for deciding who or 
what “performs” ABC’s programs.147  Instead, the Court considered the precise 
                                                          
 141. 415 U.S. 394, 396–97, 407–409 (1974) (determining that the defendant’s antenna system, 
which transmitted copyrighted broadcast programs to separate television stations, did not “perform” 
under the Copyright Act). 
 142. CATV providers used systems consisting of antennae and cables to strengthen 
copyrighted broadcast signals, providing better quality versions of television programs to viewers 
in their homes.  See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504. 
 143. See id. at 2505.  The Court in each case applied a bright-line rule that distinguishes 
“broadcasters” from “viewers”—ultimately finding that the “reception and rechanneling” by CATV 
of cable broadcasts was akin to a viewer changing the channel on his television set.  Teleprompter, 
415 U.S. at 408–09.  Thus, a CATV provider performed “essentially a viewer function,” did not 
perform the programs publicly, and therefore its use did not infringe.  Id. 
 144. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2505–06 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 86–87 (1976)). 
 145. Id. at 2506. 
 146. Id.  The majority dismissed the dissent’s contention that Aereo is not like a CATV 
provider because the cable systems transmit “constantly,” whereas Aereo’s technology “remains 
inert” until a subscriber makes a request.  Id. at 2507. 
 147. See id.  The majority again dismissed the dissent’s assertions that technological 
differences between Aereo’s system and CATV systems bring Aereo outside the realm of the 
Transmit Clause.  See id.  The dissent’s argument bears resemblance to the distinctions between 
broadcasters and viewers in Fortnightly and Teleprompter that were ultimately rejected by 
Congress when it drafted the Transmit Clause.  See id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (comparing 
interactions between Aereo’s system and its subscribers to a photocopy machine and a customer in 
which “the customer chooses the content” and the “photocopier does nothing except in response to 
the customer’s commands”); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 412 
(1974) (“When a broadcaster transmits a program . . . he has no control over the segment of the 
population which may view the program . . . .  The use of CATV does not significantly alter this 
situation.”); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 400 (1968) (noting 
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technology utilized to be non-determinative with respect to the Transmit Clause 
because the operating platform’s functionality, “invisible to subscriber and 
broadcaster alike,” in reality, “means nothing to the broadcaster” and most 
certainly “means nothing to the subscriber.”148  Rather, the Court reasoned that 
the general service Aereo offered to its subscribers was essentially the same as 
that of a “traditional cable system.”149  Accordingly, Aereo “performs” just as a 
cable provider would under the Transmit Act.150 
2.  Public Performances from Private Homes 
Having decided that Aereo “performs” within the meaning of the Copyright 
Act, the Supreme Court then addressed whether that performance was made 
“publicly.”151  Aereo claimed that the “performance” occurred independently 
from ABC’s transmission and after Aereo had converted a signal into streaming-
compatible data.152  The performance, Aereo argued, occurred when the audio 
and visual components of a program streamed to a subscriber’s screen. 153  
Further, because these performances were individualized and could only be 
viewed by a single subscriber, any such performances were private.154 
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, rejected the technological distinctions 
supporting Aereo’s argument regarding the “behind-the-scenes” channels by 
which Aereo produced video programming to its subscribers because such 
distinctions, the Court believed, had no bearing on Aereo’s “commercial 
objectives” or the “viewing experience” of its subscribers.155  Such distinctions, 
Justice Breyer suggested, distracted the infringement analysis from the behavior 
Congress meant to regulate under the Copyright Act: 
Why would a subscriber who wishes to watch a television show care 
much whether images and sounds are delivered to his screen via a 
large multisubscriber antenna or one small dedicated antenna, whether 
they arrive instantaneously or after a few seconds’ delay, or whether 
they are transmitted directly or after a personal copy is made?  And 
why, if Aereo is right, could not modern CATV systems simply 
continue the same commercial and consumer-oriented activities, free 
of copyright restrictions, provided they substitute such new 
technologies for old?  Congress would as much have intended to 
                                                          
“[b]roadcasters select the programs to be viewed; CATV systems simply carry, without editing, 
whatever programs they receive”). 
 148. Id. at 2507 (majority opinion). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 2507–08. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 2508. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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protect a copyright holder from the unlicensed activities of Aereo as 
from those of cable companies.156 
In addition, Justice Breyer remained unpersuaded by Aereo’s argument that 
its subscribers watched “personal cop[ies] of the selected program[s],” at 
isolated locations, on personal computers, viewable by no one else, would 
transport Aereo’s business model outside the scope of the Transmit Clause.157  
However, the Court rejected this argument on the grounds that this rationale was 
contrary to the legislative intent behind the Transmit Clause.158  The Court 
understood the Transmit Clause to permit “an entity [to] transmit a performance 
through one or several transmissions, where the performance [was] of the same 
work.”159  The Court, however, drew a distinction noting, “the Act d[id] not 
explicitly define ‘the public,’” but rather specified when an entity publicly 
performs.160 
According to the Court, the Copyright Act “thereby suggests that ‘the public’ 
consists of a large group of people outside of a family and friends,”161 meaning 
Aereo, by “transmit[ing] to large numbers of paying subscribers who lack any 
prior relationship to the works does so perform.” 162   The language of the 
Transmit Clause,163 the Court believed, distinctly refuted Aereo’s contentions 
that its transmissions, or performances, could not be considered public because 
the videos were viewed at isolated locations and at isolated times. 164  
Accordingly, the Court held that Aereo’s online streaming of ABC’s broadcasts 
was, in fact, a public performance.165  Aereo, therefore, infringed on ABC’s 
exclusive right to publicly perform its broadcasts.166 
                                                          
 156. Id. at 2508–09. 
 157. See id. at 2508. 
 158. Id. at 2509. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 2509–10.  A performance is made “publicly” when performed at “any place where 
a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances 
is gathered.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 161. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510. 
 162. Id. 
 163. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (stating that a performance is considered public “whether the members 
of the public . . . receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different 
times”). 
 164. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 2511.  The Court noted that the dissent would have the majority clarify and narrow 
its ruling.  Id. at 2507.  The dissent suggested that the majority’s opinion has stretched the Transmit 
Clause too far and encompasses a technology that “looks like cable TV,” and, in doing so, have 
possibly “invent[ed]” a “two-tier version of the Copyright Act, one part of which applies to ‘cable 
companies and their equivalents’ while the other governs everyone else.”  Id. at 2516 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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3.  Narrowly Tailoring the Aereo Decision 
Although the Aereo decision determining that an entity that “engages in 
activities like Aereo’s” violates the Copyright Act seems broad, the Court 
explicitly refrained from expanding its analysis to other emerging 
technologies.167  The Court expressly declined to predict or advise future courts 
as to how the Copyright Act should apply to “novel issues” where “Congress 
has not plainly marked [the] course.”168  Yet, the Court’s focus on Aereo’s 
commercial incentives, the user interaction on the subscriber’s end, and its 
explicit decision not to base its decision on technological incongruences appears 
to inherently lend itself to application in questions involving such “novel issues,” 
such as in-line linking.169 
III.  A BRAVE NEW WORLD: AEREO OFFERS AN ALTERNATIVE COPYRIGHT 
ANALYSIS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
The Aereo dissent objected to the majority’s decision believing the ruling 
overbroad, arguing the majority deliberately left open how its ruling would 
impact the application of copyright law to other technologies.170  However, the 
broadness of the majority’s analysis may render the Aereo opinion the 
touchstone for analyzing copyright infringement as it applies to new and 
developing technologies, despite the majority’s hesitance to extend its rationale 
to those cases.171  The Court’s focus on the commercial objectives of the parties, 
rather than the differences in technologies, may be exactly what courts need to 
adequately keep pace with technologies evolving faster than the law.172 
Under traditional copyright analysis, the Court does not weigh the economic 
costs of an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work until it has already 
determined that infringement has occurred and considered the fair use test.173  
                                                          
 167. Id. at 2504 (majority opinion).  The Court neither intended nor believed that the Aereo 
decision would “discourage or . . . control the emergence or use of different kinds of technologies.” 
Id. at 2510. 
 168. Id. at 2511. 
 169. See id. at 2510–11 (discussing application of the Transmit Clause). 
 170. See supra note 167–168 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra note 167–168 and accompanying text. 
 172. For example, the commercial interest approach could simplify the analysis for courts 
confronted with infringement cases that involve in-line linking or framing.  The commercial interest 
approach refocuses the analysis away from the technological intricacies to the rights at stake and 
the harm being done when those rights are violated.  See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, The 
Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 
B.U. L. REV. 731, 753–57 (2003) (discussing the harm inflicted on copyright holders by 
unauthorized use of the holders’ works, how to measure such harm, and how to punish infringers). 
 173. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994) (finding use of 
a copyrighted song infringement “but for” the court’s finding of fair use). 
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Even then, the negative impact on the owner’s market is not necessarily 
determinative if outweighed by other fair use factors that favor the defendant.174 
A major issue with the Web as a business platform for publishers and artists 
is the difficulty in getting consumers to pay for content and media when so much 
is already available for free.175  Therefore, it may be injudicious for courts to 
delay weighing the economic costs until after it has made a finding of illicit use 
of media.  Otherwise, the commercial risk for content owners may be a deterrent 
in making their creative works available to the public via the Web when their 
chance for legal recourse is low.176  In a practical sense, from the perspective of 
the third-party user or subscriber, Aereo’s transmission of cable programming 
from its website is not so different from the website owner who has in-line-
linked an image or video onto his or her website.177  In either case, the user’s 
interaction with the content is the same: he or she visits a website and, without 
the permission of the copyright holder, gains access to the content.178  In the end, 
the user has located and enjoyed what he or she was looking for and is highly 
unlikely to seek out the true source or owner of the content.179 
                                                          
 174. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “[t]he 
Supreme Court has rejected the proposition that a commercial use of the copyrighted material ends 
the inquiry under” the first prong of the fair use analysis). 
 175. See F. Gregory Lastowka, Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293, 315–17 (2001) (describing the Web as an exponentially-growing 
market for an “enormous amount of useful, creative, entertaining, original, and free content,” 
including reference materials and major publications such as The Washington Post and The New 
York Times); see also Kenneth Olmstead, Amy Mitchell, & Tom Rosenstiel, Where People Go, 
How They Get There and What Lures Them Away, PEW RES. JOURNALISM PROJECT (May 9,  
2011), http://www.journalism.org/2011/05/09/navigating-news-online/ (explaining how news 
organizations draw audiences to their websites and the different revenue-generating platforms they 
use). 
 176. Compare Sam Sanders, Taylor Swift, Platinum Party Of One, NPR (Nov. 5, 2014, 3:32 
AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/therecord/2014/11/05/361577726/taylor-swift-platinum-party-of-
one (quoting Taylor Swift in an article about her decision to remove all her music from Spotify 
saying, “[m]usic is art, and art is important and rare.  Important, rare things are valuable.  Valuable 
things should be paid for.”); with Lastowka, supra note 175, at 321 (positing that “free access 
content is a vital public good, and its availability would probably increase if the copyright laws 
were amended to reflect an interest in free access”). 
 177. Both Aereo and a linking source, in effect, locate and redirect source media to appear on 
their respective websites for user consumption.  See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text 
(explaining the dynamics of in-line linking). 
 178. Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(detailing how a user interacts with Google’s in-line linking application), with Am. Broad. Cos., 
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014) (explaining how a user interacts with Aereo’s 
interface). 
 179. The user would not think to look for an “original” or “true” source if the media appears 
to be an integrated feature of the infringing website.  See supra notes 76–78 and associated text 
(explaining the characteristics of in-line-linked media). 
798 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:777 
The community of website developers and producers views in-line linking as 
either infringement, unethical, or at the very least, feels that some proprietary 
interest has been violated.180  The negative attitude towards in-line linking is not 
necessarily unfounded.  There is something inherently deceptive in the act of 
embedding a video or image on one’s website in such a way that, in every 
practical sense, it appears to be originating from that website.181  If no credit is 
given to the true owner and no explanation or notice is offered as to the original 
source of the content, the user has no reason to believe the linking site is not the 
source of that content.  If copyright law is aimed at protecting the exclusive right 
of owners and authors of creative works to display and distribute those works, 
then the strict application of what it means to “copy” in the digital context has 
fallen short.182 
Even courts have repeatedly noted that in-line linking can be deceptive when 
it leads the user to believe that content originates on the infringing Web page, 
yet this distinction does not seem to have significant bearing on the ultimate 
holding.183  In fact, the Amazon court specifically declined to consider user 
“impression” believing “consumer confusion” outside the scope of the 
Copyright Act.184  Similarly, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have based their 
holdings, with respect to in-line linking, on whether non-permissive use of 
copyrighted digital media involved saving the content on the alleged infringer’s 
own server.185 
These judicial opinions define the act of saving data on a server, disk, 
computer, or similar medium, as the making of a copy as defined by the 
Copyright Act. 186   On the other hand, as the majority in Aereo indicated, 
technological distinctions may not be as persuasive in circumstances where the 
user is not cognizant of such distinctions.187  Following this line of reasoning, a 
                                                          
 180. See generally Masnick, supra note 65 (questioning whether in-line linking constitutes 
infringement); Linking, CHILLING EFFECTS, https://www.chillingeffects.org/linking/faq.cgi (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2015) (discussing various contentions regarding cease and desist orders); Linking to 
Other People’s Images? Allowed?, https://wordpress.org/support/topic/linking-to-other-peoples-
images-allowed (last visited Apr. 6, 2015) (soliciting comments regarding the legality of in-line 
linking). 
 181. See Chu & Wang, supra note 79, at 579–80. 
 182. A tangible “copy” of a book, which can only be consumed by a limited audience at a given 
time, is different from a “copy” of a Web page, which “can be read by millions simultaneously.” 
Lastowka, supra note 175, at 298.  In addition, “[t]hose experiencing content on the Web refer to 
the experience as ‘visiting,’ ‘surfing,’ or ‘viewing’ a cyberspatial location,” and would “not feel 
they have ‘copied’ anything.”  Id. at 298–99. 
 183. See supra Part I.C (discussing in-line linking court decisions). 
 184. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 508 F.3d 1146, 1161 (9th Cir. 2007).  The Court 
indicated that consumer confusion would be relevant under the Trademark Act.  Id. 
 185. See supra Part I.C (addressing the basis for the Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ findings for 
non-infringement). 
 186. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text (explaining the “server test”). 
 187. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2507 (2014). 
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“copy” may not necessarily mean the same thing for digital content as it does 
for content in a physical, tangible form.188  Whether content has been “copied” 
may depend less on where the content physically resides and more on user 
impressions. 
For the average user, what goes on “behind the screen” with each mouse click 
is a mere abstraction.  To this user, the distinction of whether an individual’s 
server reserves an original copy of a copyrighted work is irrelevant considering 
a user may view the same image on two different websites and, in terms of his 
interaction with that content, has actually viewed two separate “copies.” 
As previously discussed, not all in-line linking is malicious. 189   The 
determinate factor as to whether a case of in-line linking is malicious or not 
depends on the objectives of the linking site and the nature of his website.190  
These characteristics—user indifference to technological distinctions and 
objectives of the website developer performing the in-line linking—could 
suggest an appropriate move in the judicial review of in-line linking from a strict 
fair use analysis to a broader balancing test, applying both the fair use inquiry as 
well as the Aereo commercial interest test.191  Aereo may thus have opened the 
doors to a case-by-case analysis that focuses on commercial interests and the 
creative rights Congress intended to protect under the Copyright Act. 
A.  A Refocused Analysis May Better Fit Infringement in New Technological 
Contexts 
Technology is developing faster than the law.192  It is both impossible and 
impractical for the courts to attempt to outfit each particular technology that 
changes the way Internet users store, transmit, share, manipulate, or use digital 
content with its own tests for infringement and fair use.193  Congress attempted 
to preempt this concern with the enactment of the Transmit Clause in 1976.194  
However, perhaps as recognized by some on the Aereo Court, the language of 
the Transmit Clause takes on broader meaning each time it is stretched to cover 
                                                          
 188. See id. at 2509 (finding it immaterial how Aereo transmits each copy). 
 189. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 190. See Chu & Wang, supra note 79, at 577–78 (positing on the motivation behind malicious 
as well as non-malicious in-line linking). 
 191. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508–09; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 
1176–77 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 192. Aurele Danoff, The Moral Rights Act of 2007: Finding the Melody in the Music, 1 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 181, 182 (2007). 
 193. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 
275, 277 (1989) (noting the futility of judicial and legislative efforts to reconcile copyright law with 
emerging technologies using “fact-specific language that has grown obsolete as new modes and 
mediums of copyrightable expression have developed”). 
 194. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500, 505 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating Congress 
“broadly defined the term ‘transmit’ to ensure that all future technological advances would be 
covered”). 
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a new technology that might resemble that of a cable broadcasting company.195  
The Aereo dissent may be correct in its assessment of the broadness of the 
majority’s opinion, 196  but that ambiguity may yield precedent capable of 
responding to future cases involving different technologies the Court has not yet 
confronted.  It may be more prudent to shift the analysis away from investigating 
the technological intricacies and instead focus on the infringer’s objectives in 
use of the copyrighted content, particularly because it is the character of the 
infringing use with which owners of that material primarily take issue.197 
Moving away from a narrow construction of the Copyright Act in the face of 
technologically complex facts may position these infringement cases closer to 
the spirit of the Copyright Act and the rights Congress intended to protect.198  
Interestingly, the Congressional intent in drafting the Copyright Act, 
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”199 is entirely consistent 
with Tim Berners-Lee’s goals for the World Wide Web.200 
                                                          
 195. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority’s narrowing of 
the Transmit Clause implicates Cablevision’s RS-DVR); Cartoon Network LP, v. CSC Holdings, 
Inc. 536 F.3d 121, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that Cablevision’s RS-DVR device does not 
implicate even a broad reading of the Transmit Clause). 
 196. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The Aereo majority limited its ruling to 
exclude technologically complex mechanisms that have yet to appear before the courts in copyright 
infringement claims: 
It will take years, perhaps decades, to determine which automated systems now in 
existence are governed by the traditional volitional-conduct test and which get the Aereo 
treatment.  (And automated systems now in contemplation will have to take their 
chances.)  The Court vows that its ruling will not affect cloud-storage providers and 
cable-television systems, but it cannot deliver on that promise given the imprecision of 
its result-driven rule. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 197. See id. at 2510 (majority opinion) (noting the objective of Aereo is to transmit cable 
programming to “large numbers of paying subscribers who lack any prior relationship to the 
works,” while the objective of an “entity that transmits a performance to individuals in their 
capacities as owners or possessors does not perform to ‘the public’”). 
 198. Technological remedies alone may not suffice to resolve these issues.  See Allison Roarty, 
Link Liability: The Argument for Inline Links and Frames As Infringements of the Copyright 
Display Right, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1011, 1057 (1999) (concluding that there are several reasons 
to avoid reliance upon technical solutions).  “First, technological remedies [will] soon become 
obsolete.”  Id.  Second, even if such remedies were to exist, “copyright law should be able to protect 
copyrightable expression, no matter the medium.”  Id.  In addition, “[c]opyright law is intended to 
provide authors with an incentive to create works that benefit the public” and such “[u]nwanted 
links lessen the value of online content.”  Id. at 1057–58.  Such a “[l]ack of protection for online 
works sap authors’ incentive [to create] and may result in fewer online works that benefit the 
public.”  Id. at 1058. 
 199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 200. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (discussing Berners-Lee’s vision for 
universality of the World Wide Web). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The ability of the Internet to provide such vast resources and connectivity is 
what has made it a fixture in much of the population’s lives.  Constant innovation 
in computing technology has continued to open channels for communication and 
connectivity, yet for every innovation there is the potential for bad-faith activity 
and problems in many areas of law, including copyright.  The Aereo Court’s 
explicit application of a commercial interest rationale signaled a jurisprudential 
transition from probing the technological distinctions toward investigating the 
effects of using a particular technology in copyright infringement claims.  Aereo 
may well provide a viable guidepost for courts to examine when addressing 
future infringement claims concerning evolving technologies.  Such an inquiry 
could change the outcome of technology-based copyright claims, do more to 
protect the commercial interests of creators online, and preserve the spirit of 
knowledge sharing and universal access on the Internet. 
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